

## **A POSSIBLE AFRICAN DREAM WITH SOME ASIAN CHARACTERS – THE CASE OF RWANDA**

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*Abstract. This paper takes a multi-dimensional look at the theme of African futures. The plural nature of those futures comes out of the numerous differences that African states enjoy in terms of their comparative advantages and disadvantages. The primary angle of investigation, which highlights those differences, is the presence and engagement of the People's Republic of China across the continent. The case of Rwanda in particular, is one through which many of the challenges and opportunities of future, Chinese-related, African scenarios may be analysed. First, the issue of partnership is touched upon in a post-colonial context, while referencing back to colonial rule and the continent's inherited status in the world system. Second, the putative threat of 'recolonization' is examined with a focus on China's Africa-policy. Third, Rwanda's "home-grown" solutions to these and other problems are dealt with, shedding light on the landlocked East-Central African country's investment policy, approach to external actors, including China, and its vision for its own future – the lessons of which are not confined to Rwanda alone.*

*Keywords: Rwanda, development, patrimonialism, China-Africa partnership, Recolonization*

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### **Introduction: No more inferiority for Africa, but demand for partnership – Protection from Asia?**

Numerous countries of the African continent have, in recent years, registered substantial economic growth figures; against this background, and against an accentuated mantra of 'Africa Rising', Africa's future may look bright. If one takes a closer look at figures and indices, other than GDP, however, one has to realize that stark contrasts still prevail all across the continent. First of all, the level and volume of its connectedness and integration with the global system – in particular, its participation in the global economy and international trade – reminds us that a colonial type of international distribution of labour (raw materials-export orientation), together with an external push to liberalize, are coupled with a decreasing weight of the continent in international trade. Africa's six percent share of world export in 1980 had declined to two percent in 2013; its share of world imports, meanwhile, fell from 4.6 percent in 1980 to (again) two percent in 2013. As the Foundation for Democracy in Africa also pointed out in 2011, "Africa's share of world trade has remained modest for several decades and today hovers just above 3 percent of the world's total volume of trade. It remains an important priority – and challenge – for Africa to further integrate itself into the world economy and account for an increasing share of global trade" (Foundation for Democracy in Africa, 2011: 1). By the second half of the 2010's this proportion has not been changing, as UNCTAD and other international data sets show. Yet, as Evita Schmieg suggests, "for these countries, world

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trade in fact plays a major role. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign trade – measured in terms of imports and exports of goods and services – represents more than 50 percent of GDP” (Schmieg 2016: 1). Dependency analysis reveals that the core countries still exploit the peripheries and especially their resources to get richer. Due to the fact that “tariffs on processed materials are higher than on the unprocessed materials,” as Collier argues, it is “harder for the countries of the bottom billion [including many low-income African countries] to diversify their exports by processing their raw materials before exporting them” (Collier 2008: 160). This is coupled with many local protectionist policies, which favour trade barriers within these vulnerable African domestic markets. To be able to break out of a number of the traps of future development (including conflicts, the resource curse and bad governance), African countries need to “diversify their exports into labour-using manufactures and services, the sort of things that Asia is already doing. [...] to break into [global] markets they need temporary protection from Asia.” (Collier 2008: 167)

Can African governments negotiate the problems of protection and relations with the outside world, however – and can they do in a realistic manner? Such realism is not always present in the relevant contexts: as Chinua Achebe once wrote

One of the commonest manifestations of underdevelopment is a tendency among the ruling elite to live in a world of make-believe and unrealistic expectations. This is the cargo cult mentality – a belief by backward people that someday, without any exertion whatsoever on their own part, a fairy ship will dock in their harbour laden with every goody they have always dreamed of possessing. (Achebe 1983: 29)

‘African agency’ has to stay firm and realistic in articulating what Africa wants, and how its future should look. To achieve this goal, meaningful partnerships with the external world are needed, as are ‘home-grown solutions’ for development: these may already be on the horizon such as in the Rwandan case examined in this paper. Where all possible meaningful partnerships for African governments are concerned, Asian actors seem to have taken the lead in the last two decades. In addition to the heavyweight players such as China, India and Japan, a number of ‘unusual suspects’ have also appeared ‘in the loop’: Indonesia has been re-intensifying its cooperation with the continent, while South Korea, Malaysia and even Thailand have sped up their (re-)engagements with African states. The Global North, in the meantime, has accumulated fears and reservations about China’s leading role in African development. However, many Africans think their success for the future is intertwined with China’s active presence in their continent and in their everyday lives. Is this realistic?

### **Understanding Chinese Engagement with Africa: Recolonization or Not?**

China’s expansion into Africa has ignited a harsh debate about its intentions towards the continent, especially where the political and economic consequences of its outreach to African states are concerned. While Beijing insists that its policies are still following the rules of “non-intervention” and can create “mutual benefits” (Davies et al. 2014: 181), the Western reaction is critical, alleging hidden intentions. Moyo, by analysing the literature, divides currently prevalent opinions on “China’s presence in Africa” into three different types or perspectives (Moyo 2016: 59).

His first perspective is that which portrays a hegemonic China as a (re)colonizing force in Africa. This understanding has become a persistent Western media theme, one that can influence how we – and others – think about China’s African role. In the spring of 2018, for example, Rex Tillerson, then the United States’ Secretary of State under President Donald Trump, warned African states that they should be careful with Chinese loans, and criticized Beijing’s general approach towards the continent. Tillerson was fired by President Donald

Trump a short time later, but his critique of Beijing's whole approach to the continent highlighted the general criticisms of Chinese political and fiscal pressure on African governments. Chinese loans, it is argued there, are loans that "do not bring significant job creation locally", and which "do not bring significant training programs that enable African citizens to participate more fully in the future . . . oftentimes the financing models are structured in a way that the country – when it gets into trouble financially – loses control of its own infrastructure or its own resources through default" (Koran 2018). But it is not just the loans that might threaten African economies with such risks. Chinese products, also, those that "have penetrated markets in many cities, towns, and villages across Africa" and this "has created concerns for the development of local manufacturing chains and possibly deindustrialization spillovers for Africa" (Davies et al 2014: 183; see also Alden 2007). This is only one perspective on China-Africa relations today, however.

Moyo's second, alternative, perspective on those relations views China's presence in Africa as one that provides 'room for manoeuvre' (Amin 2006) for African states that have for a long time been marginalized by Western domination (Moyo 2016: 59). In this perspective China is a *balancing power*, which can offer counter incentives for exploited countries. For a long time Western aid policies have defined not just the policies, but also the realities of these African countries. China, instead, offered them freedom in their internal political life, allowing them to start thinking about development, outside of aid-defined Western-led programmes and suggestions. As Davies and his co-authors put it,

China's 'no-strings' financing offers African states that are otherwise not eligible to receive international loans, such as Sudan, a viable alternative. Many such countries are practically un-investable because of poor or non-existent credit ratings from international credit agencies" (Davies et al. 2014: 183-184).

Then there is the third perspective, which builds on the preceding viewpoints by seeing China's Africa policy as "one element of a broader process of primitive accumulation on a world scale in the context of a deepening crisis of capitalism (Moyo 2016: 59). China can thus be seen as a 'sub-imperial' force, one that is engaged in a scramble for African resources "only as a tributary component of Euro-American hegemony" (Moyo 2016: 59). This perspective can be critical about China's engagement with Africa, but places that engagement in a broader context, one where all rising semi-peripheral countries are interested in Africa, taking part in the scramble alongside the Western states. This perspective considers the increasing presence of other countries as well, such as Turkey through its infrastructure investments and cultural ties, Brazil through its South-South Initiatives, or other Asian countries, like India, Japan or Indonesia<sup>2</sup>, for instance. As Moyo puts it,

investments from the Gulf region and various Asian countries (besides China) have grown, leading to an important shift in the world economic context. The diverse inter-state relations that have emerged are too complex to fit a straightforward re-colonization (and even sub-imperialism) process. Moyo 2016: 61).

In spite of this, Moyo notes, when "discussing the idea of the scramble for Africa, much more is said about China in Africa than about India, Brazil, Turkey, the Gulf and other emerging countries" (Moyo 2016: 61).

Three different perspectives, developed in response to one country's entry into a continent, and the struggle of that highly heterogeneous, continent to deal with this entry. We cannot uncover the real face of China if we still deal only with China-Africa trade and Chinese investments in Africa – these numbers, simplifying the global trends, can be attractive, but they might still hide the reality. Africa is definitely not a single country, and not even a single

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<sup>2</sup> See Tarrósy 2016

region: each of its countries has unique and different economic environments, societies, political systems and cultural patterns, and, as Moyo concludes, they have diverse “resource endowments of interest to a variety of foreign investors, of which China is but one” (Moyo 2016: 58). This brings us to the China-centred view of these processes: China’s exports towards Africa grew by 233% between 2006 and 2016 (Gandhi 2018: this author notes that during the same period, however, India’s exports to Africa grew by 181%, Indonesia’s by 107%, Russia’s by 142% and Turkey’s by 192% ). Or, the fact that within that period, the European Union has remained Africa’s dominant trade partner, if we take into account the total values of imports and exports (Gandhi 2018). The Chinese need for raw materials often ends up in discussions about Chinese neo-colonialism, but looking at the same period, in 2006 (when China was already a net oil importer with an enormous economic growth), “China purchased only 9 percent of Africa’s petroleum exports in 2006 while the United States took 33% and Europe 36%” (Shinn 2007). By 2016, the situation had changed, not only because of Chinese growth, but also because of the US’ decision to decrease its import dependency and rely more on its own oilfields. Collected from several sources, Africa’s oil exports were 6.2 Mb/d in 2016 (BP 2017), while China imported around 7.6 Mb/d that year (EIA 2017), from which 1.4 Mb/d arrived from Africa (Albert 2017), making Beijing responsible for roughly 23% of the African oil exports – again not dominating the sector (even if it is becoming the biggest actor).

Analysing this approach, we have to consider several layers, and so, China’s presence in Africa cannot be summed up with reference to one single role played by that country alone. This has certain political implications. As Conteh-Morgan (2015: 31) puts it, “China’s engagement with Africa has become an emotional subject”, one which is generating both positive and negative comments:

Western hegemonic powers are the source of a great deal of negative framing of China’s intentions, including such matters as (1) China’s noncritical stance regarding human rights violations in Africa; (2) its economic support for authoritarian rulers and diplomatic support at the UN and other international bodies; and (3) its economic support to African governments without imposing any conditions for democracy and good governance in general. (Conteh-Morgan 2015: 31)

However, African states are guilty of turning blind eyes as well: fear of losing their *balancing power* makes them not to mention critical or challenging points, issues, and to overlook possible Chinese mistakes. The presence of China in Africa can only be described with all three perspectives: awareness of the steps that might lead to (re)colonization processes, acceptance of the possibility that China may act as a balancing power, and, finally, an understanding of globalization as a process that is definitely complex, but is certainly not fair and equal process. The foreign (as well as aid, trade and security) policy of the People’s Republic of China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century can only be made sense of in this way.

Rex Tillerson might not understand Chinese foreign policy, but Chinese loans (as well) do have a darker side: eventually you will have to repay them, which is not that easy. These loans were never forced on their recipients by China; they were, and remain, the most attractive out of the multiple opportunities offered to those recipients by other countries and financial organizations. Without any conditions, Beijing is ready to offer financial help. This means, first of all, a threat to the aid schemes and loans through which Western powers have controlled African government spending and policies for decades, and are, thus, a threat to Western interests. For already indebted African countries it can be a threat as well: for those who fail to receive loans from other countries, this can be a huge burden. While the Chinese loans are concessional, with lower interest rates or longer grace periods, if projects fail to generate the desired returns, then governments that sponsor them may find themselves in even

bigger trouble than before. A “China-is-colonizing-Africa” perspective would be well suited to the crises that would ensue from such failure. However, secondly, this financial help also offers a space, in which these countries can make independent decisions and start investment programmes outside of Western-dictated rules. It might end up in new ports, railways, or diversification of the economy. In this perspective, China shows up as a partner who understands Africa – as we will later see. With this approach China can be the balancing power, rivalling the Western interests and offering these countries some “room for manoeuvre”.

Finally, through these loans, China may (possibly) develop a market for itself, not just in terms of where they can export, but also where they can start infrastructure projects with their state-owned companies (SOEs), helping the Chinese economy. Again, China is not the only one interested in these possible investments, but is, so far, undoubtedly the most successful one. In a broader context, this new “Scramble for Africa” is like a running competition, where *China is Usain Bolt*.

For years, the accusation against China was that it only invested in countries that had desirable raw materials or other resources, and that through such investments Beijing has literally been colonizing the continent. Well, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows into Africa have definitely increased rapidly: “China has invested in 293 FDI projects in Africa since 2005, totalling an investment outlay of \$66.4 billion and creating 130,750 jobs. . . Chinese FDI into Africa is well diversified across various sectors, covering resource-oriented ones as well as services and manufacturing” (Dibie 2017). In spite of this, however, China is still far from being a hegemonic recolonizer, for, as McMillan noted, “African countries make up less than four percent of China’s global trade and less than three percent of China’s global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and stocks” (McMillan 2017). Similarly, China only accounted for around five percent of global FDI into Africa in 2015 (McMillan 2017).

Brautigam has been trying to uncover the true face of China for years now, fighting against the one-sided reports, and in a paper with her colleagues, she affirmed that their FDI has started to diversify, as her co-author commented in a blog entry. “While mining and construction still account for the bulk (54%), the stock of manufacturing FDI increased to 13% of China’s FDI stocks in Africa in 2015. [...] Chinese FDI in Africa has started to diversify away from the traditional recipients of global FDI into high-growth countries that are not necessarily resource-rich” (McMillan, 2017). Chinese FDI and loans have certainly increased in their volume in numerous African countries, but the scenario is not fundamentally different from other countries’ practices. All of them are first and foremost interested in investing in resource extraction, and the big question remains: what else do they offer to Africa?

These investments, however, diversified or not, or the loans, even with a lower interest rate, do not benefit both sides equally, as China still sticks to its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) where implementation is concerned (for example, in infrastructure investments). In the long run this can weaken the economy of the African countries: first of all, quality is still an important issue with these SOEs, and African countries have to rigorously check these investments to ensure that they are appropriate for upcoming decades. Secondly, African countries should insist that local companies are involved in such projects. China pushes its SOEs into African markets, too, because of the country’s burning economic pressures to keep its GDP growth and to maintain the smooth running of the Chinese economy. African states have to be critical, since beside the Chinese companies, Turkish, Brazilian, Indian and other companies are waiting in the line. This could create a healthy competition, from which Africans can potentially maximize their own benefits. Rwanda, ‘Africa’s Singapore’ (according to the hopes of President Paul Kagame) is just the right country to prove that only this multi-perspective view can help us understand the Chinese presence in the African countries.

### **Today's realities – tomorrow's dreams – Focus on Rwanda**

For any investment, a politically and economically stable and secure environment is indispensable. Some actors are less cautious than others, but security is of utmost importance for each of them. To be able to attract FDI, Africa needs to work out policies and daily behaviours, which can convince any possible investor to enter their markets. Obviously, countries of the continent – due to their realities, whether or not they experience ongoing armed conflicts across their lands, or how open their local markets are, how far they are integrated into at least a regional economic community – differ a lot in what they are able to offer for their potential would-be partner. Although Chinese actors had shown bravery in some cases in the past to enter even a less reliable market, today, the Go Global strategy of the People's Republic of China advocates more caution and calculation in any investment or acquisition scheme. Those countries with more safeguards (and still with 'room to manoeuvre' for the sake of the best deal) can expect larger volumes of Chinese money and engagement. One of the best examples for this is the small landlocked East-Central African country of Rwanda.

The Rwandan case is particularly interesting for the discourse on Africa's futures: on the one hand, the country "suffers from a number of quite severe disadvantages. Landlocked, under-endowed with natural resources [...] and with an exceptionally unfavourable person-land ratio, it continues to be extremely poor in per capita income and human-development terms" (Kelsall 2013: 120). On the other hand, the post-genocide period has shown numerous positive results in basically all walks of life. During comparative field research conducted by the authors in 2015 and 2016, several Rwandan interviewees confirmed the growing number of economic opportunities in their country. The Vision 2020 national development plan (launched in 2000) also speaks about transforming Rwanda into a knowledge-based middle-income country. This is strictly driven by the Kagame-led government, which at the same time has installed developmental patrimonialism as the ruling ideology of both the government and the country. A country under that ideology is one where "the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralized way with a view to enhancing their own and others' income in the long run rather than maximizing them in the short run" (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2017: 171).

One of the vehicles of the country's transformation is the Rwandan Development Board (RDB). It focuses on investment promotion and contributes to a services-oriented economy for the future. As Yvette Mutoni, then head of investment promotion in RDB, explained to the present authors<sup>3</sup>, tourism has been planned to become one of the main drivers of a bright future. In particular, conference tourism with all the newest and modern facilities in Kigali City is meant to position Rwanda as the leading actor in East Africa. To be able to attract more companies into this sector the RDB offers a one-stop centre to register any company in the country: in just about six hours on the ground floor of the RDB building all the necessary paperwork can be easily done. In addition, the government has been making progress in bringing down the costs of running any business, especially where electricity costs are concerned. Yet another significant step to attract FDI is to provide procurement procedures that are as transparent as possible. Proposals are thus double checked in all sectors, and the state organ responsible for all this is the Rwanda Standards Board (RSB), governed by a Board of Directors composed of major stakeholders from government, industry and academic institutions, as well as from consumer associations.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Interview recorded on March 24, 2015, in the headquarters of the RDB.

<sup>4</sup> See: <http://www.rsb.gov.rw/quick-nav/home.html>

The overall picture of Rwanda is one of “sound macroeconomic management and strong growth, albeit with some concerns about external dependence, external balance, and structural transformation. GDP growth averaged 6.8 percent per year between 2002 and 2010” (Kelsall 2013: 141). According to Trading Economics, Rwanda’s economy grew very well in 2017, growing by 10.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2017, the most since the third quarter of 2014, and following an 8 percent expansion in the previous period of that year. The service sector grew by 11 percent (10 percent in Q3), mainly due to trade administrative and support service activities, and to wholesale and retail trade. In addition, agriculture increased 10 percent. (Trading Economics 2017)

If we look at the different sectors, services have gained the most, but at the same time the financial sector, as well as the communications sector, together with the transport sector have grown stronger substantially. “Construction has been another lead sector, driven in part by large infrastructural investments. [...] [At the same time] the balance of payments is being helped by rapid increases of FDI” (Kelsall 2013: 141). With regard to construction, especially that of physical infrastructure (badly needed all across the country), the role of external actors were highlighted in an interview with President Kagame, conducted in the Cabinet Meeting Room in the Presidency Compound on March 24, 2015. Rwanda’s president acknowledged the Chinese presence in Africa, but compared it with the same country’s presence in Europe, asking “if this is good for Europe, why cannot it be good for Africa?” He also added that if “things go wrong [in a project, for instance], it is not only the Chinese’ fault, because if things do not have ownership, things cannot be going into a good direction.”<sup>5</sup> All these statements also highlight the stubborn way required for the future: African countries to go their own ways in a systematic and also self-critical manner, always learning both from their past and the current successes and failures of others. China, from this angle, is certainly a point of reference for many, including Rwanda.

### China in Rwanda

Rwanda, with all its disadvantages, is at first glance hardly the most attractive partner for China. If the latter were only recolonizers, they would surely not be interested in the Eastern African country. Still, Beijing is as active in the country as it is in other African states, perhaps even more so: the Asian giant is Rwanda’s second<sup>6</sup> biggest source of FDI, mainly in the manufacturing and real estate sectors, and its “greatest support to Rwanda’s development process is in the form of concessional loans, grant aid, technical support in major infrastructure projects as well as students’ scholarships in critical sectors such as health, education and technology.”<sup>7</sup>

The two states established political relations as early as 1971, and since the 1994 genocide Chinese assistance has played an important role in Rwanda’s health and education sectors. When analysing the Chinese approach in Rwanda, Habyarimana and Wu tried to understand why Beijing is interested in such a country, looking at strategic, social development and economic motives (Habyarimana and Wu 2017: 67 – 70), and concluded that stability is a key indicator in Rwanda’s success. The country’s goal of becoming Africa’s Singapore has been strongly assisted by its “stability and security” (Waldorf 2017: 84). At first sight, Singapore has better conditions with its ports and strategic position versus the landlocked African state,

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<sup>5</sup> Interview recorded on March 24, 2015, in Kigali.

<sup>6</sup> The country’s biggest source of such investment is the European Union.

<sup>7</sup> See: China, Rwanda to further boost relations, says Chinese foreign minister. January 14, 2018, The New Times Rwanda. Available at: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/227569>

but Rwanda can offer even more than its already outstanding stability: it is close to vital markets in East and Southern Africa, and has additional connections towards Central Africa. The *U.S. Commercial Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce*, for example, notes that not only has the country an internal market of 11.8 million people with a 'growing middle class', but also 'a market potential of 162 million consumers in the East Africa Community (EAC)', as well as easy access 'to the Eastern DRC market of approximately 35 million people' (2017).

So, a growing domestic market, a mature and dynamic private sector, a leading political role in the region (and the status of a respected power in both Africa and the wider world), a liberal and secure investment environment, a high quality and cost effective labour force, a customs union with EAC countries, a developed infrastructure, an institutionalized economy and a competitive tax system all characterize the country (Habyarimana and Wu 2017: 70), making it attractive together with its position. Rwanda is the "second easiest place to do business in sub-Saharan Africa. Investors can register a business online or in person in as fast as six hours through the Rwanda Development Board" (Habyarimana and Wu 2017: 70) – something that was confirmed during our own field research. The RDB – which many African countries want to copy – controls investments in the country and is responsible for quality control as well, deciding about projects and concessions. The Kigali Convention Centre, which hosted the 27<sup>th</sup> AU Summit in 2016<sup>8</sup>, has the story of a Chinese success and failure as well. "In 2009 a Chinese construction firm, the Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) was entrusted to implement the German-designed blueprint for the project. But the opening, which was initially scheduled for 2011 had to be postponed several times. This led to discrepancies between the Rwandan building contractor and the Chinese construction firm, which ultimately led to the "re-allocation of the project to Summa, a Turkish Engineering firm" (Opobo 2016). It was this firm, in the end, who finished the project, a fact that offers us some interesting implications:

1. As Davies et al. noted, "the term 'state capitalism' is regularly used when describing this government–corporate alignment [of China], but in many instances, it may be overly simplistic when describing the Chinese government's strategy toward Africa. Chinese SOE's are often very competitive with each other for contracts in Africa; at times, they are more competitive than they are collaborative. The phrase 'state capitalism' might imply a monolithic order, but in China, this is not the case (Davies et al. 2014: 182). The case of the Convention Centre shows us, even if there is a pressure from the government, their companies face competition, and with competition, they face requirements as well.

2. The Chinese presence, if it leads to a balance of power, can create competition as well, eventually helping African states to find the best solution – finance-wise, as well.

3. These companies have to be checked and controlled, an activity which is the responsibility of African states. The balancing role cannot come with immunity against corruption or bad quality. Rwandan authorities were ready to rescind the presence in their country of a Chinese company, undermining the recolonization theory (at least as and the only valid perspective). As Moyo notes, "the China recolonization thesis assumes that there is a dominance of Chinese capital in Africa and that the Chinese state now has greater influence on African states. However, the empirical evidence on the situation on the ground shows that China's increased presence in Africa is only relatively high in recent times and, when compared with the

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<sup>8</sup> See: <https://au.int/en/summit/27>



overall presence of Euro-American-based capital in Africa, it is far from being dominant” (Moyo, 2016: 59).<sup>9</sup>

4. Finally, a Turkish company took over the job, reflecting on the global scramble for Africa, also showing: Chinese are neither the sole powers, nor the only solutions there.

### **A different approach towards Chinese investments is needed for the future**

On our 2015 field trip in Rwanda during our discussion with President Kagame we raised a question about China, if he considers their presence an advantageous one, or not. The answer, as coherent and clear as it could be, was a definite affirmation, adding the fact that there are challenges, but what he could feel is that what they want from Africa, can benefit the African countries: to avoid any problems the ones (meaning African governments) making the deal have to stand firm and coherent, reflecting on the much needed and praised African Renaissance.

These countries have to closely monitor all such (not just Chinese) activities, not to weaken their economies for the long run, to maximize the profits and benefits for the society, to introduce methods and investments which can help their economies and processes, not furthering exploitative methods. The opinion and the Rwandan situation reflects on the phenomenon that Chinese companies can introduce failed methods, but if used and controlled in a better way this can offer a “room for manoeuvre” and power to make better deals with Western actors as well. And as we could see through the case of Rwanda: further countries (Turkey, Brazil, etc.) can be used for a bargaining power against China as well. It all depends on these African countries.

### **Conclusion**

There are many African futures, not just one. As long as there are differences across countries in many aspects ranging from economic performance to stability, from strong central administration to more regions-focussed approaches, national strategies and plans of development naturally vary, also taking into account factual features of the country and realities of everyday life. In addition to inherited structures, processes to organize governance and public administration (from the colonial period), African states have been experimenting with many ‘own African ways’. The Rwandan case has shown that its ‘home-grown solutions’ – also motivated by Singapore’s model of development in part – can summarize what such an African country can realistically hope for the future. Although many steps have been rigorously and consistently taken to achieve its goals, we can agree with Kelsall that to have such a success story be sustainable, “and increased institutionalization of power is probably required” (Kelsall 2013: 144).

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<sup>9</sup> Moyo further notes that “the recolonization thesis is mainly posited by various liberal Western scholars and is widely floated in the mainstream media, as well as by some African scholars, using the epitaph of the destructive dragon” (Moyo 2016: 59). To underline this statement, he focuses on land grabbing and the media coverage of land grabbing in Africa: “The recent increase in the acquisition of large scale landholding by foreign entities is another area in which China’s presence in Africa is believed to have grown. However, when we examine the data relating to land grabbing in Africa [...] China is not the major land grabber. China and India, plus all the other semi-peripheries (e.g. Turkey, the Gulf), have attempted to acquire less than 40% of the grabbed land. Instead, numerous multinational companies from America, Europe and Scandinavia, (which are relatively new in the foreign resource grab game) are the dominant players involved in the land grab” (ibid. 63-64).

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## **ВОЗМОЖНАЯ АФРИКАНСКАЯ МЕЧТА С НЕКОТОРЫМИ АЗИАТСКИМИ ЧЕРТАМИ (НА ПРИМЕРЕ РУАНДЫ)**

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*Аннотация. Эта статья представляет собой многогранный взгляд на тему африканского будущего, чей множественный характер вытекает из многочисленных различий между африканскими государствами с точки зрения их сравнительных преимуществ и недостатков. Глубокое проникновение Китайской Народной Республики на континент является основным направлением исследования, подчеркивающим эти различия. В частности, в случае с Руандой можно проанализировать многие проблемы и возможности будущих вариантов развития событий в Африке, связанных с Китаем. Во-первых, вопрос о партнерстве затрагивается в постколониальном контексте, тогда как он служит отсылкой ко временам колониального господства и унаследованному статусу континента в мировой международной системе. Во-вторых, возможная угроза «реколонизации» рассматривается с акцентом на африканскую политику Китая. В-третьих, разбираются собственные решения Руанды этих и других проблем, проливая свет на инвестиционную политику, попытки сблизиться с внешними акторами, включая Китай, этой не имеющей выхода к морю восточно-центральноафриканской страны, чье видение собственного будущего – урок, не ограничивающийся одной Руандой*

*Ключевые слова: Руанда, развитие, патримониализм, китайско-африканское партнерство, реколонизация*

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